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THE COST OF ALLOWING THE PUBLIC TO ENJOY THE OZARKS
The Cost of Allowing the Public to Enjoy the Lake of the Ozarks:
Should Landowners Be Protected Over the Public?
Anderson v. Union Electric Company1
Alex Langley

I. INTRODUCTION
In Anderson v. Union Electric Company, the Missouri Supreme Court
reviewed the Missouri’s Recreational Use Act (“RUA”).2 The highly
anticipated decision held that Union Electric Company (“UE”), the majority
owner of the Lake of the Ozarks (“the Lake”), was not responsible for the
death of the Anderson children when a stray electrical current stemming from
their parents’ dock killed them.3 The court held that because the Lake
allowed the public to use the facilities without paying an admission fee, the
Lake was not liable under the RUA.4 The court rejected the Anderson’s
argument that the fee they paid for permission to have a dock on their
property constituted a fee under the statute.5 As such, the Lake was not held
liable.6
While the Missouri courts have rarely addressed the statute,7 this case
highlights the problems with the RUA as it is currently drafted. The statute
was drafted with a well-intentioned policy rationale of “encourage[ing] the
free use of land for recreational purposes in order to preserve and utilize
[Missouri] natural resources.”8 But the legislature has created a statute that
allows large companies and organizations to escape liability through the fine
parsing of the term “charge” in the statute. Therefore, either the legislature
should alter the RUA or the Missouri courts should alter their interpretation
1

463 S.W.3d 783 (Mo. 2015).
Anderson v. Union Elec. Co., 463 S.W.3d 783, 784-85 (Mo. 2015) [hereinafter Anderson
II].
3
Id. at 789.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Missouri courts have only reviewed the RUA on two occasions, other than Anderson.
8
Foster v. St. Louis County, 239 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Mo. 2007).
2
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of the RUA. These changes would incentivize UE, the party with the most
control, to place additional requirements on docks at the Lake to ensure the
public is safe from stray electrical currents. This note will outline why the
Missouri Supreme Court should have decided the case differently and why
the Missouri legislature should change the statute so that the burden of
protecting the public is placed on the party with the most resources.
First, this note will set forth the facts of the case where the Missouri
Supreme Court determined that the Lake was not responsible for the
Andersons’ children’s death. The second part will examine the historical
context of the RUA in Missouri and highlight alternative Recreational Use
Statutes from other states. Third, this note will lay out the Missouri Supreme
Court’s rationale for the case. The fourth section will describe how the
court’s decision was in line with Missouri precedent and how the court could
have distinguished past cases so that the Andersons could proceed with their
case. Lastly, this note will suggest possible ways the Missouri legislature
could change the statute to prevent these types of incidents in the future.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Angela Anderson and her husband (“Andersons”) own a home on the
Lake of the Ozarks (“the Lake”).9 The Lake is manmade and connected to the
Bagnell Dam; both are owned and operated by Union Electric Company
(“UE”).10 The original purpose of the dam was to supply the area with
hydroelectricity.11 Now, thousands have built homes around the Lake and
even more visit “the Lake’s scenic beauty and recreational allure.”12
Additionally, many of the homeowners around the Lake have docks, giving
their homes direct access to the Lake.13 In order for a homeowner to build a
dock, he or she must submit an application, including written plans for the

9

Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 784-85; Anderson v. Union Elec. Co., No. WD76927 2014
Mo. App. WL 2574628, at *2 (Mo. App. W.D. June 10, 2014) [hereinafter Anderson I].
10
Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 784.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Lake News Online, Higher Court Rules Against Ameren in Lawsuit Over Electrocution
Deaths, OZARKS FIRST (June 19, 2014, 2:03 PM), http://www.ozarksfirst.com/news/appealcourt-rules-against-ameren.
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dock, to UE.14 After review, UE grants the homeowner a permit for the dock
or other structure in return for an annual fee.15
UE’s permit program places certain “requirements for these
improvements, including requirements regulating the manner in which
landowners may supply electricity to their docks.”16 However, UE does not
“require dock owners to install [ground fault interrupt devices] as a condition
of obtaining a dock permit.”17
The Andersons built a dock on the Lake, supplied it with electricity,
but did not use a ground fault interrupt device, so as to “prevent injury in the
event of an electrical fault.”18 In July 2012, Alexandra and Brayden, the
Andersons’ two children, were swimming in the Lake near their dock when a
stray electrical current from the Andersons’ dock killed the children.19 The
Andersons then filed a wrongful death suit against UE arguing that UE
negligently caused the death of their children.20 UE asked the court to dismiss
the case under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.346.21 The trial court agreed with UE,
dismissing the case for failing to state a claim because UE is immune from
liability under The Recreational Use Act22 (“RUA”).23

14

Application for an Ameren Missouri Permit, AMEREN, https://www.ameren.com//media/missouri-site/Files/lakeoftheozarks/lakeapplication.pdf.
15
Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 784-85.
16
Id. at 785.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 785; Anderson I, No. WD76927, 2014 Mo. App. WL 2574628,
at *1.
21
Id. “Except as provided in sections 537.345 to 537.348, and section 537.351, an owner of
land owes no duty of care to any person who enters on the land without charge to keep his
land safe for recreational use or to give any general or specific warning with respect to any
natural or artificial condition, structure, or personal property thereon.” Anderson II, 463
S.W.3d at 786.
22
Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 537.345-537.348 (2012). (“As used in sections 537.345 to 537.347, and
section 537.351, the following terms mean: (1) “Charge”, the admission price or fee asked
by an owner of land or an invitation or permission without price or fee to use land for
recreational purposes when such invitation or permission is given for the purpose of sales
promotion, advertising or public goodwill in fostering business purposes; (2) “Land”, all real
property, land and water, and all structures, fixtures, equipment and machinery thereon;
(3) “Owner”, any individual, legal entity or governmental agency that has any ownership or
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However, the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District disagreed.24
The court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the Andersons’
complaint.25 Specifically, it found that the fee the Andersons’ paid fit under
the “charge” definition of RUA and therefore UE did not have immunity.26
The case was then appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court.27 The supreme
court reversed the Missouri Court of Appeals and upheld the trial court’s
opinion.28 Ultimately, the Missouri Supreme Court determined that when an
individual is injured on publicly accessible property, and a fee is not charged,
the landowner is not liable and protected under the RUA.29
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Each state has a statute that shields a landowner from liability when
he or she grants access to the public for recreational purposes.30 The purposes
of these statutes are to encourage landowners to open up their property for
public use and to give the public greater access to the natural beauty of the
outdoors.31 Collectively, such legislation is referred to as recreational use
security interest whatever or lease or right of possession in land; (4) “Recreational use”,
hunting, fishing, camping, picnicking, biking, nature study, winter sports, viewing or
enjoying archaeological or scenic sites, or other similar activities undertaken for recreation,
exercise, education, relaxation, or pleasure on land owned by another; ….. (d) Any noncovered land. “Non-covered land” as used herein means any portion of any land, the surface
of which portion is actually used primarily for commercial, industrial, mining or
manufacturing purposes; provided, however, that use of any portion of any land primarily for
agricultural, grazing, forestry, conservation, natural area, owner’s recreation or similar or
related uses or purposes shall not under any circumstances be deemed to be use of such
portion for commercial, industrial, mining or manufacturing purposes.”). Id.
23
Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 786; Anderson I, No. WD76927 2014 Mo. App. WL 2574628,
at *2.
24
Anderson I, No. WD 76927 2014 Mo. App. WL 2574628, at *1.
25
Id. at *3.
26
Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 785; Anderson I, No. WD76927 2014 Mo. App. WL 2574628,
at *2-3.
27
Id.
28
Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 786.
29
Id. at 790.
30
Harris M. Pittman, The Arkansas Recreational-Use Statute: Past, Present, and Future
Applications for Arkansas Landowners and Recreational Users of Land, 60 Ark. L. Rev.
849, 849 (2008).
31
Id.
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statutes.32 A recreational use statute allows a landowner to escape liability for
injuries occuring on recreational land except for instances of gross
negligence33 or if an individual pays money in return for using the land.34
Most of the statutes have vastly different standards for the latter exception.35
Missouri’s standard is “an admission price or fee,”36 whereas other states
have a standard simply requiring “consideration.”37
A. Missouri’s Recreational Use Statute History
In the seminal case of Genco v. Connecticut Light and Power Co.,
Laura Genco dove into Candelwood Lake, owned by Connecticut Light and
Power Company (“Company”), and struck the bottom of the lake. 38 Genco
argued that the Company should have warned swimmers about the depth of
the water or should have ensured that the water levels were sufficient so that
divers would not be injured.39 The Company argued it was protected from
liability because the lake is open to the public.40 The Appellate Court of
32

Id.
States differ in the standard of negligence required to make landowners liable for an
individual injury: “willful or malicious” Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41.510, “malicious or grossly
negligent” Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 105.672.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 785; Anderson I, No. WD76927, 2014 Mo. App. WL 2574628,
at *3.
37
Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 504, 510 (9th Cir. 1983).
38
Genco v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 7 Conn. App. 164, 165 (Conn. App. 1986).
39
Id. at 165.
40
The statute is almost verbatim to the Missouri statute. Defendants argue the lake would be
considered open to the public based on the following statutory language: “Sec. 52557g. Liability of owner of land available to public for recreation; exceptions. (a) Except as
provided in section 52-557h, an owner of land who makes all or any part of the land
available to the public without charge, rent, fee or other commercial service for recreational
purposes owes no duty of care to keep the land, or the part thereof so made available, safe for
entry or use by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous
condition, use, structure or activity on the land to persons entering for recreational purposes.
(b) Except as provided in section 52-557h, an owner of land who, either directly or
indirectly, invites or permits without charge, rent, fee or other commercial service any person
to use the land, or part thereof, for recreational purposes does not thereby: (1) Make any
representation that the premises are safe for any purpose; (2) confer upon the person who
enters or uses the land for recreational purposes the legal status of an invitee or licensee to
whom a duty of care is owed; or (3) assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury
to person or property caused by an act or omission of the owner. (c) Unless otherwise
33

254

JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 22, NO. 2
Connecticut agreed with the Company.41 The court found that Genco was not
charged a fee for entering the lake and the lake was generally available to the
public, even if portions of the lake were restricted in access.42 Missouri courts
have relied on this case in their decisions regarding Missouri’s RUA.
Missouri’s first opportunity to review the RUA came in Wilson v.
United States.43 In Wilson, a member of the Boy Scouts of America, went on
a trip to Fort Leonard Wood with his troop.44 During the trip, some of the
boys, including Wilson, discovered irrigation piping stacked next to the cabin
where the troop was sleeping.45 The boys carried the pipe away from the
cabin, where they raised the pipe so it stood almost straight up in the air and
came in contact with electrical lines.46 All of the boys were shocked, but
Wilson was the only boy to die from his injuries.47 Wilson’s parents brought
a wrongful death suit against the United States (“Fort”).48
The Fort argued it was not liable for Wilson’s death because it had
immunity from damages because of the RUA.49 The parents argued the Fort
was not shielded from immunity for three reasons.50 First, the boys were
charged two dollars to stay in the cabins, which equated to a fee under the
RUA exceptions.51 Second, the Fort received an economic gain from
allowing the Scouts to stay overnight.52 Third, Wilson died on “non-covered
land.”53 The Eighth Circuit rejected the parents’ arguments and found that the
agreed in writing, the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be deemed
applicable to the duties and liability of an owner of land leased to the state or any subdivision
thereof for recreational purposes.” Con. Gen. Stat. § 52.
41
Genco, 7 Conn. App. at 168.
42
Id. at 169-72.
43
Wilson v. U.S., 989 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1993).
44
Id. at 955.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 956.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. Parents also argued, “the Boy Scouts were not members of the ‘general public,’ and
thus were not covered by the Act”…. and “the United States negligently failed to protect
against an ultra hazardous condition.” Id.
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Fort was immune from liability because it was shielded by the RUA.54
Specifically, the court held that the two dollar fee was not an entrance fee,
but rather for staying overnight in the cabin.55 Therefore, the fee did not
constitute a charge under the RUA.56 Additionally, the court held that the fee
covered the cost of “maintaining and equipping the facility” and so the Fort
did not receive an economic gain.57 Therefore, the Fort’s cabin does not
constitute “non-covered land.”58 Following Wilson, Missouri courts were
silent on further explanation of the RUA for 14 years.
The Missouri Supreme Court once again had to address the definition
of “charge” in Foster v. St. Louis County.59 In that case, Foster was injured
while playing football in a local park.60 The park is open to the public and
fees are only charged for tours and use of picnic tables.61 However, Foster
did not participate in either of these activities.62 Foster sued the city, who
owned and operated the park, for damages resulting from his injuries.63
Foster argued the park was considered “non-covered land” because it was
used for commercial use as evidenced by the fees required for the tours and
picnic areas; therefore the park should not be shielded from liability under the
RUA.64 The Missouri Supreme Court rejected Foster’s argument and held
that the park did not qualify as “non-covered land” because the park had few
activities that required paying a fee.65 Specifically, the Court found that the
park did not charge a fee for access to the area where Foster was playing
football and therefore could not be used “primarily for commercial
purposes.”66

54

Id. at 958.
Id. at 956.
56
Id. at 957.
57
Id. at 956, 958.
58
Id. at 958.
59
Foster v. St. Louis County, 239 S.W.3d 599 (Mo. 2007).
60
Id. at 600.
61
Id. at 600-01.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 601.
64
Id. at 601-02.
65
Id.
66
Id.
55
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B. Different State’s Interpretations of Recreational Use Statutes
The Ninth Circuit addressed Nevada’s Recreational Use Statute67 in
Ducey v. US.68 In Ducey, three people enjoyed a day at the Lake Mead
National Recreational Area (“LMNRA”).69 Lake Mead is maintained by the
National Park Service (“NPS”) but allows the Eldorado Canyon Resorts, Inc.
(“Resorts”)70 to operate a store, refueling stations, trailer rentals, and boat
docks.71 Neither NPS nor Resorts require an entrance fee to use the
LMNRA.72 In September 1974, a flash flood swept through the Lake Mead
area killing three people inside the recreational area.73 The families of the

67

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.510(1) (West 2015) provides that:
“Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, an owner of any estate or interest in any
premises, or a lessee or an occupant of any premises, owes no duty to keep the premises safe
for entry or use by others for participating in any recreational activity, or to give warning of
any hazardous condition, activity or use of any structure on the premises to persons entering
for those purposes…. (a) Limit the liability which would otherwise exist for:
(1) Willful or malicious failure to guard, or to warn against, a dangerous condition, use,
structure or activity.
(2) Injury suffered in any case where permission to participate in recreational activities was
granted for a consideration other than the consideration, if any, paid to the landowner by the
State or any subdivision thereof. For the purposes of this subparagraph, the price paid for a
game tag sold pursuant to NRS 502.145 by an owner, lessee or manager of the premises shall
not be deemed consideration given for permission to hunt on the premises.
(3) Injury caused by acts of persons to whom permission to participate in recreational
activities was granted, to other persons as to whom the person granting permission, or the
owner, lessee or occupant of the premises, owed a duty to keep the premises safe or to warn
of danger.”
68
Ducey v. U.S., 713 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1983).
69
Id. at 507.
70
While Resort is required to pay the NPS a percentage of the sales made off of retain
spaces, including the boat dock and trailer rental area, the year of the accident Resort did not
make any payments to the NPS. It is unclear in the Anderson case if the retail spaces located
around the Lake pay a fee to Ameren or if they are allowed to operate on the Lake free of
charge. In either case, the payment from the retail space to the governmental or state owner
of the recreational area is not dispositive.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
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deceased filed a lawsuit against the NPS and Resorts for failing to warn
against the pending flood.74
The NPS argued they were immune from liability under Nevada’s
recreational use statute because there was no consideration for entering the
LMNRA, or alternatively, if there was consideration, it was not paid to the
NPS but to Resorts.75 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that
the government’s interpretation of consideration was too constrictive.76 First,
the court contrasted the definition of consideration with the more narrow
terms “fee or charge” and relied on the inherently broad nature of the term
consideration.77 Second, the court concluded that it did not matter to whom
the consideration was paid to as long as that entity had the “power to grant or
deny permission to participate in recreational activities.”78 Lastly, the court
relied heavily on the policy rationale that when “a landowner derives an
economic benefit from allowing others to use his land for recreational
purposes, the landowner is in a position to post warning, supervise activities,
and otherwise seek to prevent injuries.”79 As such, the NPS could not avoid
liability under the Nevada’s recreational use statute.80
In Plano v. City of Renton, the petitioner used the city’s lake and
mooring area.81 The city charges either a fee for every night a boat is moored
overnight, or allows an individual to pay an annual fee for the ability to use
the boat launch.82 The petitioner moored her boat for free one night and then
paid for her boat to be moored a second night.83 On her way to her boat, she

74

Id. at 508.
Id. at 509-10.
76
Id. at 510.
77
Id. The Ninth Circuit looked to Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of
Consideration: “a term of art, a word with a well-understood meaning in the law, embracing
any right, interest, profit or benefit.” Id.
78
Id. at 513.
79
Id. at 511.
80
Id. at 514-15. The 9th Circuit also noted that “if the United States itself had operated [the
same type of property the Resort operated] the purchases by the [deceased individuals]
would constitute ‘consideration’ in return for permission to recreate in [the LMNRA] within
the meaning of consideration exception to the Nevada statute.” Id. at 512.
81
Plano v. City of Renton, 103 Wash.App. 910 (WA App. 2000).
82
Id. at 912.
83
Id. at 913.
75
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slipped and fell on the metal ramp connecting the moor to the shore.84 The
petitioner sued the city, which argued that it had immunity because of a
recreational use statute.85 Washington’s recreational use statute protects
landowners from liability unless a fee is charged.86 The city claimed the moor
was generally available to the public, and the ramp where the petitioner was
injured did not require an access fee.87 The court concluded that because the
petitioner paid to access the location where her injury occurred, the city could
not avoid liability.88 Further, the court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion
that while the petitioner did not pay for the use of the ramp itself, the ramp
where the injury occurred was a “necessary and integral part” of the dock
where petitioner paid to moor her boat.89
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the Missouri Supreme Court found the Western
District Court of Appeals erred in finding UE was not liable under the

84

Id. at 911.
Id.
86
Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.210(1) (West 2016) (“Except as otherwise
provided in subsection (3) of this section, 1 any public or private landowners or others in
lawful possession and control of any lands whether designated resource, rural, or urban, or
water areas or channels and lands adjacent to such areas or channels, who allow members of
the public to use them for the purposes of outdoor recreation, which term includes, but is not
limited to, the cutting, gathering, and removing of firewood by private persons for their
personal use without purchasing the firewood from the landowner, hunting, fishing,
camping, picnicking, swimming, hiking, bicycling, skateboarding or other non-motorized
wheel-based activities, hang gliding, paragliding, the riding of horses or other animals, clam
digging, pleasure driving of off-road vehicles, snowmobiles, and other vehicles, boating,
nature study, winter or water sports, viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic, or
scientific sites, without charging a fee of any kind therefor, shall not be liable for
unintentional injuries to such users).
87
Plano, 102 Wash. App. at 913-14.
88
Id. at 915.
89
Id. The court also noted that “[t]he reason why the two ramps and the connecting
gangways exist is to provide access to the floating dock, a fee-generating portion of the park.
An overnight moorage patron cannot even pay the required moorage fee without walking up
one of the ramps, including the one on which Plano fell. These facts establish that the ramp
where the injury occurred is in the recreational area for use of which Renton charges a fee.”
Id.
85
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RUA.90 On appeal, the Andersons raised two issues, both of which the
Missouri Supreme Court rejected.91
First, the Andersons did not dispute that this case fell under the
RUA.92 Instead, the Andersons contended that in this case, UE is not
protected against liability because the Andersons paid a “use fee” to UE for
the dock permit and the right to access the lake, which they argue is a
“charge” under the RUA.93 The court disagreed; finding that the fee the
Andersons paid UE for the dock permit did not constitute a “charge” under
the RUA.94 The court relied on three cases,95 all of which ruled that the
landowners were not liable for injuries occurring on the land when the fee
was incidental to being on the land.96
The court ruled that the dock permit fee did not constitute an
admission fee, and therefore was not a “charge” under the RUA.97 In fact, the
Andersons admitted that their children were allowed to enter the Lake at any
time and were not required to pay a fee to UE each time they entered the
Lake.98 The ruling turned on the conclusion that “[w]hat matters is not where
or how the children entered the Lake, but whether UE imposed a charge for
that entry.”99 The court concluded that the dock permit fee pertained only to
the Andersons’s ability to build a dock and did not have any bearing on the
Andersons’s ability to enter the Lake.100 Therefore, the permit fee was not an
90

Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 790.The case is reviewed de novo and “when a landowner is
entitled to immunity under the RUA, the trial court has no discretion and must dismiss the
petition under Rule 55.27(a)(6).” Id. at 786.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 787.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 788; see also Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.345 (emphasis added) (“Charge: the admission
price or fee asked by an owner of land or an invitation or permission without price or fee to
use land for recreational purposes when such invitation or permission is given for the
purpose of sales promotion, advertising or public goodwill in fostering business purposes.”).
95
Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 787-89; Wilson v. United States, 989 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1993);
Genco v. Connecticut Light and Power Co., 1 Conn.App. 164 (1986); and Foster v. St. Louis
County, 239 S.W.3d 599 (Mo. 2007).
96
Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 787.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 787-88.
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admission fee.101 As such, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred
because the RUA gives immunity to the UE. The Andersons’ claim was
dismissed.102
The Andersons also argued that UE is not entitled to liability
protection under the RUA because the dock is “uncovered land,” which is an
exception under the statute.103 The court also rejected this argument.104 The
Andersons argued that they are entitled to the exception because UE
primarily uses the banks of the Lake for business and docks; therefore those
profits transform it into commercial purpose.105 However, the Court pointed
out that the Eighth Circuit in Wilson specifically rejected this argument.106
Additionally, the UE cannot make a profit from the permit fees.107 The UE’s
operation license explicitly states that the UE can charge for dock permits “if
the use is ‘consistent with the purpose of protecting and enhancing the scenic,
recreational, and other environmental values.’”108 Based on this license, the
court concluded UE had the permit fees, not for commercial reasons, but “to
recover the cost of its permit program.”109 Therefore, the “non-covered land”
exception for liability under the RUA did not apply to the Andersons’s
case.110
The dissent determined that the permit fee was a charge under the
RUA.111 Unlike the majority opinion, the dissent argued that the statute
should be strictly construed.112 Additionally, the dissent distinguished the
cases brought up by the majority because they dealt with temporary uses of

101

Id. at 788.
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 789 (holding “that a landowner does not necessarily use the property primarily for
commercial purpose under … merely because the owner charges fees for things other than
admission”.).
107
Id. at 790.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 537.348(3)(d) (2016)).
111
Id. at 791 (Teitelman, J. dissenting).
112
Id. at 790-91 (Teitelman, J. dissenting).
102
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property, unlike the Andersons’s case, where the permit fee “grants private
access to the land owner and his or her guests.”113
V. COMMENT
The Missouri Supreme Court was partially correct in determining that
that Andersons’s dock did not constitute non-covered land. However, the
court was incorrect in ruling that the dock permit fee did not constitute a
“charge” under the RUA. Since the court has interpreted “charge” very
narrowly, the onus is on the Missouri legislature to change the RUA’s
definition of “charge" to ensure property owners are incentivized to protect
the public.
The statutory definition of non-covered land is explicit. The statute
states that recreational areas are not considered “non-covered land,” and
recreational land by definition cannot be commercial.114 As the court points
out, this directly contradicts the Andersons’s argument.115 Furthermore, if
the Lake was used primarily as commercial land, then UE would be in direct
violation of its permit to operate the Lake.116 On this point at least, the court
was correct to reject the Andersons’s argument.117
However, the Court was incorrect in determining that the Andersons
did not pay a “fee.” Instead, the Appellate Court and the dissent were correct
when they held UE liable under the RUA. The statute makes a landowner
liable if they charge an admission price or if they charge a fee. In this case,
113

Id. at 791 (Teitelman, J. dissenting).
MO. REV. STAT. § 537.345 (2016). “Noncovered land as used herein, means any portion
of any land, [that is used] primarily for agricultural, grazing, forestry, conservation, natural
area, owner's recreation or similar or related uses or purposes shall not under any
circumstances be deemed to be use of such portion for commercial, industrial, mining or
manufacturing purposes. Id. (emphasis added).
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the Andersons were not charged an admission price but they were charged a
fee — a dock permit fee. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a fee is “a
charge or payment for labor or services.”118 Based upon the definition of fee,
the Andersons did make a payment to UE in return for the approval of their
dock permit. Therefore, based upon the definition of “fee,” the Missouri
Supreme Court should have reversed the lower court’s decision to grant UE
summary judgment and remanded the case back to the lower court.
The Andersons’s case is also distinguishable from both Genco v.
Connecticut Light and Power Company 119and Foster v. City of St. Louis.120
In Genco, the injured individual did not pay any type of fee for using the
premises.121 Further, the Genco landowners did not charge anything on the
premises.122 This is an entirely different situation than the instant case
because the Andersons did pay a fee and individuals paid for other items
around the Lake, such as boat rentals.
Additionally, Foster can be distinguished from the case at hand
because the injured individual did not pay a fee to be on the premises, even
though the park did charge fees for the use of other areas in the park.123
Foster was not using the areas in the park that required a use fee.124 In
contrast, the Andersons were using their dock, which required a dock permit
fee. The Anderson children would not have been injured if the dock was not
on the premises because there would not have been a stray electrical current.
The instant case is further distinguishable from Genco and Foster
because in neither case did the landowners regulate the use of a manmade
addition to the property as UE regulates the docks on the Lake. The Company
in Genco allegedly violated the RUA because it failed to adequately warn the
public of a danger, and in Foster the allegation was a failure to ensure the
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park was without holes.125 These allegations are different than the claims in
the present case. UE was already aware that the Andersons’s dock existed. In
fact, it both reviewed and approved the dock. It failed to ensure that the dock
was safe for the dock owners and the public at large. With their approval
authority, UE took upon itself the responsibility to ensure swimmers safety in
regards to dangers posed by docks.
Wilson also can be distinguished from the Andersons’ case. First, in
Wilson, the building the Boy Scouts were staying in, and had paid to use, did
not injure the Scouts.126 Instead, the Scouts moved items from one location
on the property closer to electrical lines and then raised a very large pipe,
which eventually came into contact with the line.127 In contrast, the Anderson
children did not take any affirmative steps to cause their deaths; the injury
came from the manmade structure the Andersons had paid for and had UE’s
permission to build.
In addition, the cases are different because of the amount of money
exchanged in return for using the land. In Wilson, the two-dollar fee was
considered incidental, used for “maintaining and equipping the facility,” and
only entitled the payor to use the cabin.128 This fee did not allow visitors to
touch or use the pipes. However, when the Andersons paid money to UE,
they were paying specifically to build and use the dock, which included
entering the Lake through the dock, which caused the injury. This is the most
distinguishing factor, and should entitle the Andersons to a different outcome
under Wilson.
Alternatively, the Missouri Supreme Court could change its
interpretation of “fees.” For example, the court could have taken its approach
from Plano. The Plano court found there was an implied charge to use the
boat ramp to access the moor, which the plaintiffs paid to use.129 The court
reasoned that “the metal ramp where Plano fell is a necessary and integral
part of the moorage.”130 Like Plano, the Andersons paid for permission to
build a dock, thereby giving the Anderson children an access point to the
125
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Lake. The Missouri Supreme Court could have found, like in Plano, that the
dock was an integral part of the Andersons’s property and the best way for
them to enter the Lake.
Some may argue that the children could have entered the Lake
without using the dock, just like other Lake property owners who do not have
a dock. While this is true, the fact that but for the dock, the injury would not
have occurred removes this argument. The dock does not have to be the only
way to access the Lake. In Plano, theoretically, there were many ways to
access the boats, but the plaintiff accessed the boat by way of a ramp, which
then caused the injury.131 In the instant case, the Anderson children died
because the way they accessed the Lake was not properly regulated by UE
and therefore caused a dangerous situation, which ultimately killed both
children. Had the UE required an in-person inspection, included a clause
detailing the requirements for properly grounding wires for docks, or
required additional permits from another entity that would inspect the
electrical grounding, the Anderson children probably would not have died.
Therefore, when the Andersons paid for the ability to build a boat dock, they
paid a fee to enter the Lake, making UE liable for injuries resulting from the
dock.
The best solution to the problem that arose in the Andersons’s case
would be for the Missouri legislature to amend this statute to better protect
the public. Specifically, the legislature should adopt a standard similar to
Nevada’s recreational use statute as illustrated in Ducey.132 The standard in
Ducey was “consideration,” which is broader than Missouri’s current
standard.133 If the Missouri Supreme Court had applied this standard, UE
would have been liable for the Anderson children’s deaths. Following the
Ducey court’s reasoning, UE is in the best position to ensure that the docks
are electrically grounded and are safe for swimmers, and thus should be
responsible for any damages arising out a dock’s malfunction.
Some may argue that the holding in Deucy cannot be adopted because
the company in Deucy makes a profit from the land, which is why the court
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decided it was in the best position to regulate safety. While UE does not
make a profit from fees generated by approving dock permits, the fact that it
charges a fee still places it in the best position to regulate safety. UE already
requires homeowners to get approval for docks on the Lake and charges a fee
for the administrative costs of approving dock construction plans. Therefore,
it logically follows that UE could pass on, to the dock owners, the
administrative costs of ensuring a dock’s electricity is grounded.
Additionally, because UE has to approve the docks before they are built, it is
in the best position to ensure the docks are safe for dock users and the people
swimming nearby.
Others may, nonetheless, argue that the additional requirements
would place too much of a burden on UE. This argument is unpersuasive
because UE now, after the Anderson childrens’ death, requires an additional
permit, inspections, and fee for the ability to run electricity to an individual’s
dock.134 UE now specifically requires adherence to specific instructions for
grounding wires, which probably would have saved the Anderson children.135
Clearly, the UE had the ability to require proper grounding before the
Anderson children died, without any additional costs. This shows that
requiring private companies, like UE, to ensure safety is not unreasonable.
Landowners who open up their property for public use should be
incentivized to ensure safety. Yes, they cannot be required to know about
everything. There is no suggestion that UE “close the lake for maintenance or
police the area for hazards, such as floating objects and submerged tree
trunks, and the owner cannot possibly protect people from the risks inherent
in water sports.”136 It would be unreasonable to hold the park liable for not
knowing about the hole the defendant injured himself on in Foster. Nor is it
suggested that companies be liable for the actions of rambunctious boys who
engineer a way to hurt themselves as in Wilson. Additionally, while the
death of the Andersons’ children is tragic, if this were a one-time occurrence
it would be reasonable to equate this to an act of God, which UE could not
have foreseen. Unfortunately, this is not the only time this type of death has
occurred. In fact, this is one of many occurrences where stray electrical
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currents from non-grounded outlets on docks have injured or killed
swimmers at the Lake.137 The Lake is the only party that can put a stop to
these types of injuries.
Therefore, this note suggests that an organization, with complete
control over who can build docks and the sole power to regulate what can or
cannot be on a dock, has an inherent duty to keep people safe when it can.
The Lake has been charged with keeping the environment safe while
allowing the public to enjoy nature. However, the public cannot enjoy the
beauty of the Lake if they are going to die from stray electrical currents
because UE did not specifically require in the dock permits that dock owners
should secure electricity running to the docks under UE’s supervision.
VI. CONCLUSION
Anderson v. Union Electric Company represents Missouri’s continued
support of landowners over the safety of individuals. In this case, the
Missouri Supreme Court could have departed from precedent, distinguished
past cases, expanded the definition of “charge,” or changed Missouri’s
interpretation of the Recreational Use Act. Alternatively, the court should
have found that past cases had not adequately defined what a “fee” was and
remanded the case to the lower court for trial. However, the question is not
whether the Missouri Supreme Court made the right decision in this case, but
whether the law itself is correct. The Missouri legislature needs to decide if
the desire to make recreational land more open for public enjoyment
overrides the need to keep the public safe on the recreational land. The RUA
should be amended to encourage people to enjoy the wonderful recreational
offerings of Missouri, but it should also hold the UE responsible for obvious
potential injuries to visitors, because the company is in the best position to
address these safety issues.
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